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I.  Introduction. 
The celebrated Taylor (1993) rule posits that the central bank uses a fairly simple 
rule when conducting monetary policy.  This rule is a reaction function linking 
movements in the nominal interest rate to movements in inflation and possibly other 
endogenous variables.  A rule is called active if the elasticity with respect to inflation 
(denoted by τ) is greater than one; the rule is called passive if τ is less than one.  Recently 
there has been a considerable amount of interest in ensuring that such rules do no harm.  
The problem is that by following a rule in which the central bank responds to endogenous 
variables, the central bank may introduce real indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria into 
an otherwise determinate economy. These sunspot fluctuations are welfare-reducing and 
can potentially be quite large.   
A standard result is that to avoid real indeterminacy the central bank should 
respond aggressively (τ > 1) to either expected inflation (see Bernanke and Woodford 
(1997) and Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000)) or current inflation (see Kerr and King (1996)).  
We will refer to the former rule as “forward-looking” and the latter as “current-looking”.  
These analyses are all reduced-form sticky price models, where the underlying structural 
model is a labor-only economy and money is introduced via a money-in-the-utility 
function (MIUF) model with a zero cross-partial between consumption and real balances 
(ie., Ucm =0).
1  
Our analysis differs from those of Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Gali, 
Gertler (2000)), and Kerr and King (1996) on one important dimension, the addition of 
                                                           
1 Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001a) analyze Taylor rules in a continuous time MIUF 
environment with an arbitrary cross-partial Ucm and demonstrate that the conditions for determinacy 
  1capital and investment spending. This added margin makes determinacy much harder to 
achieve.  In contrast to these papers we demonstrate that essentially all forward-looking 
rules are subject to local indeterminacy, and that a sufficient condition for local 
determinacy is for the monetary authority to react aggressively to current movements in 
inflation.  These findings are of more than academic interest since several central banks 
currently use inflation forecasts as an important part of their decision-making on policy 
issues.   
A recent paper by Dupor (2001) analyzes a similar sticky price environment with 
investment but comes to substantially different policy prescriptions than those presented 
here.  He demonstrates that a passive rule (τ < 1) is necessary and sufficient for local 
equilibrium determinacy.  The essential difference between the two papers is that Dupor 
utilizes a continuous-time model.  A key difference between a discrete-time and 
continuous-time model is the no-arbitrage relationship between bonds and capital. In 
discrete time the future marginal productivity of capital equals the real interest rate; in 
continuous time today’s marginal productivity of capital equals the real interest rate. This 
contemporaneous condition provides an extra restriction in continuous time.  In a model 
in which the central bank conducts policy with an interest rate instrument, this extra 
restriction alters the determinacy conditions across the two models. 
This paper extends Dupor’s (2001) analysis in three ways.  First, as noted, we 
examine a discrete time model and demonstrate that this timing assumption has an 
important implication on equilibrium determinacy.  Second, we consider a more general 
utility specification in that we make no assumption on the sign of Ucm. Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
depend on the sign of Ucm.  Their analysis abstracts from investment spending. 
  2discrete-time model in the current paper allows us to examine both current- and forward-
looking Taylor rules.  
The outline of the paper is as follows.  The next section develops the basic model.  
Section III provides the determinacy analysis.  Section IV compares these results to the 
continuous time analysis of Dupor (2001).  Finally section V concludes.  An appendix 
proves the main propositions. 
 
II.  A Sticky Price Model 
  The economy consists of numerous households and firms each of which we will 
discuss in turn. We are concerned with issues of local determinacy. Hence, without loss 
of generality we limit the discussion to a deterministic model.  As is well known, if the 
deterministic dynamics are not unique, then it is possible to construct sunspot equilibria 
in the model economy.  Below we will use the terms “real indeterminacy,” “local 
indeterminacy,” and “sunspot equilibria” interchangeably.
2   
  Households are identical and infinitely-lived with preferences over consumption, 
real money balances and leisure given by 





where β is the personal discount rate, ct is consumption, and 1-Lt is leisure. We utilize a 
MIUF environment because of its generality (see Feenstra (1986)).  In contrast to 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a), we adopt the convention of end-of-period money balances 
in the utility function.  We do this to be consistent with Dupor’s continuous time 
                                                           
2 Benhabib et al. (2001b) conduct a global analysis of equilibrium determinacy in a continuous time model 
  3analysis.
3
   For the purposes of this paper this timing issue is of limited importance. The 
utility function is given by: 
 U(c,m,1-L)  ≡ V(c,m)  – L. 
Most studies investigating the conditions for determinacy have assumed a zero 
cross-partial between consumption and real balances (ie., Vcm =0).  In contrast we make 
no assumption on the nature of V(c,m).  The conditions for determinacy are completely 
independent of V.  Of course this generality comes at a price.  Most notably we assume 
an infinite labor supply elasticity.  Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000, 2001b) provide a 
complementary determinacy analysis in a flexible price environment in which the 
determinacy conditions are independent of labor supply elasticity.  We thus restrict our 
analysis to an infinite labor supply elasticity.   
  The household begins the period with Mt cash balances and Bt-1 holdings of 
nominal bonds.  Before proceeding to the goods market, the household visits the financial 
market where it carries out bond trading and receives a cash transfer of   
from the monetary authority where M denotes the per capita money supply and Gt is the 
gross money growth rate.  After engaging in goods trading, the household ends the period 
with cash balances given by the intertemporal budget constraint: 
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without capital.  Local indeterminacy is a sufficient condition for global indeterminacy. Similarly, local 
determinacy is a necessary condition for global determinacy.   
3 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001a) refer to this as “cash-when-I’m-done timing” (CWID) as it is assumed that 
the money balances that aid in transactions are the money balances that the household has after leaving the 
store.  The natural alternative is cash-in-advance (CIA) timing.  That is, the money balances that aid in 
transactions are the money balances that the household has upon entering goods market trading so 
that .  As noted by Benhabib et al. (2001a), the discrete time analog to a 
continuous time MIUF model is CWID timing. 
t t t t
s
t t t B R B G M M A − + − + = − − 1 1 ) 1 (
  4Kt denoes the households accumulated capital stock that earns rental rate rt and 
depreciates at rate δ.  The real wage is given by wt while Πt denotes the profit flow from 
firms.   The first order conditions to the household’s problem include the following: 
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Equation (1) is the familiar labor supply equation, while (2) is the asset accumulation 
margin.  Equation (3) is the Fisherian interest rate determination in which the nominal 
rate varies with expected inflation and the real rate of interest on bonds.  Equation (4) is 
the model’s money demand function.   
As for firm behavior, we follow Yun (1996) and utilize a model of imperfect 
competition in the intermediate goods market.  Final goods production in this economy is 
carried out in a perfectly competitive industry that utilizes intermediate goods in 
production.  The CES production function is given by 
Yy i d i tt =
−− ∫ {[ ( ) ]}




where Yt  denotes  the  final  good,  and  yt(i)  denotes the continuum of intermediate  
goods, each indexed by i ∈ [0,1].  The implied demand for the intermediate good is thus 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 

















    
where Pt(i) is the dollar price of good i, and Pt is the final goods price.   Perfect 
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Intermediate goods firm i is a monopolist producer of intermediate good i.  Each 
intermediate firm rents capital and hires labor from households utilizing a CRS Cobb-
Douglass production function denoted by f(K,L) ≡ K
αL
1-α. Imperfect competition implies 
that factor payments are distorted.  With zt as marginal cost, we then have rt = ztfK(Kt,Lt) 
and  wt = ztfL(Kt,Lt).  Since factor markets are competitive, the intermediate goods firms 
take zt as given. 
As for intermediate goods pricing, we follow Yun (1996) and utilize the 
assumption of staggered pricing in Calvo (1983).  Each period fraction (1-ν) of firms get 
to set a new price, while the remaining fraction ν must charge the previous period’s price 
times steady-state inflation (denoted by π).  This probability of a price change is constant 
across time and is independent of how long it has been since any one firm has last 
adjusted its price.  Suppose that firm i wins the Calvo lottery and can set a new price in 
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  6where  denotes the marginal utility of a dollar.  The optimization 
condition is given by 
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If ν = 0 so that all prices are flexible each period, zt = (η-1)/η < 1.  This latter term  z ≡ 
(η-1)/η is a measure of the steady-state distortion arising from monopolistic competition.  
In the case of sticky prices (ν > 0), zt will not typically equal z and will reflect the time 
varying monopoly distortion.   
A recursive competitive equilibrium is given by stationary decision rules that 
satisfy (3), (4), (5), (6), and the following:    
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Note that equations (7)-(9) are essentially the real business cycle (RBC) conditions 
distorted by marginal cost and the effect of real money balances on the marginal utility of 
consumption. This latter distortion is proxied by the nominal rate of interest.  If these 
distortions were held fixed, we would have the RBC model, and would thus be assured of 
a unique equilibrium.  Indeterminacy arises because of endogenous fluctuations in the 
nominal interest rate and marginal cost. 
  7  To close the model we need to specify the central bank reaction function.  In what 
follows we assume a reaction function where the current nominal interest rate is a 
function of inflation.
4  We will consider two variations of this simple rule: 
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where i = 1 is a forward-looking rule, and i = 0 is a current-looking rule.  
  Under any such interest rate policy the money supply responds endogenously to be 
consistent with the interest rate rule.  It is this endogeneity of the money supply that leads 
to the possibility of indeterminacy.  By real indeterminacy, we mean a situation in which 
the behavior of one or more real variables is not pinned down by the model.  This 
possibility is of great importance as it immediately implies the existence of sunspot 
equilibria which in the present environment are necessarily welfare reducing.    
 
III.  Equilibrium Determinacy.  
  We will now discuss each Taylor timing convention in turn.  Because we are 
interested in highlighting the effects of capital on the determinacy conditions, in each 
subsection we will first present results for a labor-only economy and then note how the 
determinacy range is affected by the inclusion of the investment margin. 
 
Forward-Looking Taylor Rules: 
  Consider a labor-only economy in which production is linear in labor (α = 0). 
Combining (3), (7) and the forward-looking policy rule gives 
                                                           
4 Including output in the Taylor rule would have only minor effects on the local determinacy conditions.  
  81 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~
+ + + − + = t t t t z z π π τ .         (10) 
The tildes denote log deviations from steady-state values, except for the inflation rate in 
which case it is simply the deviation from the steady-state value.  As for marginal cost, 
Yun (1996) demonstrates that (5)-(6) can be combined to yield the following log-
linearized “Phillips curve” 
1
~ ~ ~
+ + = t t t z π β λ π ,          ( 1 1 )  
where πt = (Pt/Pt-1) –1, denotes the inflation rate, and λ = (1-ν)(1-νβ)/ν.   
Equations (10)-(11) represent a system in zt and πt. This is essentially the model 
analyzed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).  Their analysis suggested that to avoid 
indeterminacy the central bank should react aggressively (but not too aggressively) to 
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For plausible parameter values (eg., β is close to one, λ and α each about 1/3) indicate 
that the determinacy range is quite large with an upper bound of about 13.  Hence, an 
aggressive (but not too aggressive) forward-looking rule is determinate in this 
environment. 
Adding capital basically eliminates all these determinate equilibria.  One 
important reason is because in the model with capital there is always a zero eigenvalue.  
To see this substitute (8) and (9) into (7) to obtain 
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We thus abstract from it for simplicity. 
  9This is an arbitrage relationship linking the real return on bonds to the real return on 
capital accumulation.  Note that both elements are forward-looking.  In particular, for a 
forward-looking policy rule this arbitrage relationship does not depend on time t 
variables. This immediately suggests a zero eigenvalue.
5 
Since capital is the only state variable in the system a zero eigenvalue implies that 
if there is determinacy capital must immediately jump to the steady state.  This suggests 
that even if there is determinacy the welfare properties of the rule would be disastrous.  
Conversely, if there are sunspots, one can always construct them in a model in which 
capital is set to steady-state for all periods.  Hence, the conditions for determinacy in a 
model with capital are at least as tight as in the model with labor.  But in fact, the 
conditions are sufficiently tighter:  (NEED MORE DISCUSSION HERE.) 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a forward-looking Taylor rule. 
In the Calvo sticky price model with investment a necessary condition for determinacy is 
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where  ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 δ β α δ β − − = − − − = a and a . 
 
                                                           
5 The appendix formally shows the presence of a zero eigenvalue.  The labor equation has time t elements 
but can be substituted out given the assumption of linear leisure.  However, a zero eigenvalue arises even 
in models without an infinite labor supply elasticity—separable preferences are a sufficient condition. 
  10These regions for determinacy are remarkably narrow.  Suppose that α = λ = 1/3, δ = .02, 
and β = .99, so that a1 ≈ .35 and a2 ≈ .03.  In this case, the first region is an empty set, and 
the second region is 1 < τ < 1.0027.  In comparison to the labor-only economy, the 
presence of capital makes determinacy essentially impossible. 
 
Current-Looking Taylor Rules: 
  As before, consider the labor-only economy.  The system is given by (11) and the 
counterpart to (10)  
1 1
~ ~ ~ ~
+ + − = − t t t t z z π π τ .   
It is straightforward to show that we have real determinacy if and only if τ > 1.   To 
understand why, assume to the contrary that there is indeterminacy when τ > 1.  Consider 
a sunspot increase in πt+1. Indeterminacy implies that  t t z z < +1  and  t t π π < +1 .  If  τ > 1 
then marginal cost (zt) and inflation (πt) must be inversely related. But the Phillips curve 
implies that they move together which gives us our contradiction.  A similar argument 
can be used to show that when τ < 1 indeterminacy is possible.  Remarkably this 
conclusion is not affected by the addition of investment to the model: 
  
Proposition 2:  Suppose that monetary policy is given by a current-looking Taylor rule.  
A necessary condition for determinacy is that τ > 1.  Furthermore if  2 1 ) 1 2 ( a a − > β λ  
where  ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 δ β α δ β − − = − − − = a and a  then in the Calvo sticky price 
model with investment τ > 1 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy. 
 
  11Note:  Given the above calibration α = 1/3, δ = .02, and β = .99, so that a1 ≈ .35 and a2 ≈ 
.03, there can only be indeterminacy for some values of τ > 1 if prices are extremely 
sticky, λ < 0.083.  Given that λ = (1-ν)(1-νβ)/ν this implies that less than 25% of firms 
adjust their prices every quarter (where ν denotes the probability that a firm can adjust 
prices in the current period).  The above, however, is only a sufficient condition for 
determinacy.  Even if λ < 0.05 the range for indeterminacy is very small 1.1 < τ < 1.69. 
 
IV.  A Comparison with a Continuous Time Analysis. 
In a recent paper Dupor (2000) conducts a similar determinacy analysis in a 
continuous time MIUF model.  The environments appear to be the same: prices are sticky 
as in Calvo (1983), output is produced using both labor and capital, and preferences are 
linear over labor.  However, Dupor reaches a quite different outcome: he reports that τ < 
1 is necessary and sufficient for local determinacy.   
  In this section we will explore the reasons for the different results.  Dupor assumes 
a utility function of the form U(c,m,1-L) ≡ ln(c) + V(m) – L.  For simplicity we maintain 
this restriction.  Following Proposition 1, however, we need not make any assumption 
regarding V(c,m).   We will first present a discrete time analysis of the model using this 
functional form, and then turn to Dupor’s continuous time version. 
   To compare the models we must specify whether in discrete time we have a 
current- or a forward-looking Taylor rule.  In continuous time limit, there is no 
distinction between a current-looking and forward-looking rule.  We initially assume that 
the discrete time model is given by a forward-looking rule since the comparison between 
discrete and continuous time is especially straight forward and dramatic.   
  12  Using the Fisher equation (3) the capital accumulation equation is 
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+
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t L K f z
R }       ( 1 2 )    
Equation (12) is key in what follows.  As noted above, this is a no-arbitrage relationship: 
the real return on bonds must be equal to the real return on capital accumulation.  With a 
forward-looking rule this expression is entirely in terms of time t+1 variables, and is the 
cause of the zero eigenvalue above. 
  Note that since cash balances are separable, the money demand curve (4) is 
irrelevant for determinacy issues.  Money is the residual that can be backed out at the 
end. Let x ≡ L/K.  The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are given by 
  t t t c x z ~ ~ ~ + =α                  ( 1 3 )  
  1 2 1 2 1
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  1
~ ~ ~
+ + = t t t z π β λ π ,             (17) 
where  ) 1 ( 1 2 δ β − − ≡ a , β ≡ 1/(1+ρ), and css denotes steady-state consumption, etc.  
The continuous time counterpart to this discrete-time system is given by 
t t t c x z ~ ~ ~ + =α  (18) 
t t t x a z a ~ ) 1 ( ~ ~ ) 1 ( 2 2 α π τ − + = −         ( 1 9 )  
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t t t z ~ ~ ~ λ π ρ π − =            ( 2 2 )  
The fundamental difference in this system is that the no-arbitrage capital accumulation 
(19) equation is solely in time-t variables.  We can use (18) and (19) to eliminate zt and xt 
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For determinacy, we need exactly one negative eigenvalue. By inspection, we have one 
eigenvalue equal to css/Kss > 0.   The remaining two are the solution to the following 
quadratic equation: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ] )) 1 ( [( ) ( 2 2
2
2 − − + − − + ≡ τ α λ ρ τ λα a q a q a q h . 
In continuous time determinacy requires that one root be negative and one be positive.  
The sign of h(0) is given by the sign of (τ-1).  Since h → ∞ as either q → -∞ or q → ∞,   
τ < 1 is both a necessary and sufficient for determinacy. (This is analogous to Dupor’s 
Theorem 1.)  If τ  > 1 the system is either overdetermined or underdetermined depending 
on the sign of  ] ) / ) 1 ( [( ) 0 ( 2 ρ τ λα − − = ′ a h .  If this term is positive, the remaining two 
roots are negative and the system is underdetermined.  If this term is negative, the 
remaining two roots are positive and the system is overdetermined.  In the former case, 
there are a continuum of equilibria, while in the latter there are no stationary equilibria.  
This corresponds to Dupor’s Theorem 2. 
  14  How does the analysis differ in discrete time?   The key difference is that the no-
arbitrage equation (14) is entirely in time t+1 variables so that it does not provide any 
restriction on time-t behavior.  This comparison can be made exact in the following way. 
Scroll the expressions (13), (15), (16) and (17) forward one period.  Scrolling everything 
but the capital accumulation forward implies that the system is given by 
  1 1 1
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+ + + + = t t t c x z α               (23)
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  2 1 1
~ ~ ~
+ + + + = t t t z π β λ π ,            (27)
plus the following time t restrictions 
  t t t c x z ~ ~ ~ + =α                  ( 2 8 )  
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  1
~ ~ ~
+ + = t t t z π β λ π .             (31) 
Using (23) and (24) to eliminate zt+1 and xt+1 from the system, we can write the dynamic 
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  15Or 
1 2 + + = t t B A ψ ψ  
Notice the similarity in the discrete time versus continuous time matrices.  This system 
has three eigenvalues.  The time t restrictions (27)-(31) provide three restrictions on the 
equilibria.  But we have seven unknowns.  Hence, for determinacy, we need all three of 
the eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle.  By inspection, one of the eigenvalues is 
given by 1+css/Kss.  The remaining two are the solution to the following quadratic 
equation: 
) 1 ( } ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( )[ 1 ( { ) ( 2 2 2
2
2 − − + + − − + − + ≡ τ λα β α α τ λ β a q a a q a q g . 
Notice the similarity between this quadratic and the h(q) function that arises in the 
continuous time model.   In continuous time we need only one explosive root; in discrete 
time we need two explosive roots. The quadratic g(q) is identical to the quadratic 
equation that arises in the proof of Proposition 1 (see the Appendix).  Hence, there is 
indeterminacy for all values of τ.  
We have now duplicated the results of Dupor and demonstrated how the local 
indeterminacy that arises with the discrete time model becomes local determinacy (with τ 
< 1) in the case of continuous time.  The matrix for the continuous time case is the 
continuous time analogue to the discrete time matrix.  However, for determinacy we need 
both roots to be explosive with discrete time and only one explosive root for continuos 
time.  The key difference is that in continuous time there is an additional restriction: at 
time t the marginal productivity of capital equals the real interest rate while in discrete 
time model this relationship is in terms of the future realizations of returns. Therefore the 
key difference is in the no-arbitrage relationship between bonds and capital.  
  16  What about the comparison between continuous time and a discrete time model 
with a current-looking rule?  As noted before with continuous time there is no distinction 
between current and forward-looking rules.  The difference between the discrete-time 
model with a current-looking rule and a continuous time model is just as striking.  A 
necessary (and sufficient for plausible parameter values) condition for determinacy with 
a current-looking rule is τ > 1, while with continuous time τ < 1 is necessary and 
sufficient.  Once again the extra restriction present with continuos time plays an 
important role in the difference between the two models. 
   
V.  Conclusion. 
The central issue of this paper is to identify the restrictions on the Taylor interest 
rate rule needed to ensure real determinacy.  A classic result in the literature is that an 
aggressive response to future or forecasted inflation is sufficient for determinacy (eg., 
Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Clarida, Gali, Gertler (2000)).  These earlier 
analyses ignore the central role of investment spending.  The role of investment across 
the business cycle has a long tradition in monetary economics so that ignoring it seems 
like a bad idea.  We have demonstrated above that in the case of forward-looking policy, 
inclusion of the investment choice dramatically shrinks the region of determinacy.  The 
end result is that for anything but the most extreme parameter values this model with 
Calvo stickiness implies that monetary policy must respond aggressively to current 
inflation to generate determinacy. In short, there is a clear danger to any policy that is 
forward-looking. 
Appendix 
  17Proposition 1: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a forward-looking Taylor rule. 
Then in the Calvo sticky price model with investment a necessary condition for 
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where  ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 δ β α δ β − − = − − − = a and a . 
Proof:   
Given the assumption that utility is linear in leisure the first order conditions (7) and (8) 
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Substituting (A1) and equation (A1) scrolled forward one period into (A2) yields 


























.      (A3) 
We can express this as 
 x t+1 = F(xt,zt+1,zt).             (A4) 
The resource constraint (9) provides another equation: 
  .         (A5)  t t t t t c K x K K − δ − + =
α −
+ ) 1 (
1
1
  18The money demand curve (4) implies that real balances depend only on ct and Rt.  Using 
(A1) we then have that ct depends only on Rt, zt and xt.  Using the policy rule we can then 
write (A5) as 
 K t+1 = G(xt,πt+1,Kt,zt).           (A6) 
Using (A1) and the policy rule, we can express the Fisher equation (3) as 
 
 z t+1 = H(πt+1,xt,xt+1,zt).           (A7) 
 
In summary, we have three equations (A4), (A6), and (A7).  The Phillips curve (11) 
yields πt+1 = P(πt, zt).  The linearized Euler equations are given by 
 x t+1 = F(xt,zt,zt+1) 
 K t+1 = G(xt,πt+1,Kt,zt) 
 z t+1 = H(xt,xt+1,πt+1,zt) 
  πt+1 = P(πt,zt). 
Let wt denote the vector [xt, zt, πt, Kt] so that the linearized system can be expressed as 
 Awt+1 = Bwt  
where A and B are 4x4 matrices with elements given by the derivatives of F, G, H and P.  
After inverting A, we are left with the matrix A
-1B which has four eigenvalues.  Since 
there is only one state variable in this system (Kt), we need three explosive eigenvalues 
for determinacy.  Once again one eigenvalue is zero, while another is given by  






where ss denotes steady-state levels.  Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
determinacy is that the remaining two roots be outside the unit circle. The relevant 
quadratic equation is given by 
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where   
  2 2 a J β =  
  2 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a a J β τ λ + − − =  
  ) 1 ( 2 0 − − = τ λ α a J  
  ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 δ β α δ β − − = − − − = a and a . 
The above implies  
  ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 α τ λ − − = a J . 
If τ < 1 then J(1) < 0 and J(0) > 0 which means one root is in (0,1).  Hence, a necessary 
condition for determinacy is τ > 1.  Under this restriction, J(1) > 0 so that additional 
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     (A12) 
To make further progress and tighten the bound more closely, we must consider the two 
cases where the solutions to J are real or complex. 
 
Suppose first that the two roots of J are real: 
We first note that J is quadratic and convex.   In this case (assuming the roots are real, 
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Combined with (A12) and τ > 1 these two regions of determinacy (assuming the roots are 
real) are  
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Suppose instead that the roots are complex:  










τ αλ − −
= . 
Since J0 > 0, this yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy 










.          (A15) 
Combining the real and complex regions and noting that α < a1 a necessary condition for 
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Proposition 2:  Suppose that monetary policy is given by a current-looking Taylor rule.  
A necessary condition for determinacy is that τ > 1.  Furthermore if  2 1 ) 1 2 ( a a − > β λ  
where  ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 δ β α δ β − − = − − − = a and a  then in the Calvo sticky price 
model with investment τ > 1 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy. 
Proof:  The linearized Euler equations are given by 
 x t+1 = F(xt,zt,zt+1) 
 K t+1 = G(xt,πt,Kt,zt) 
 z t+1 = H(xt,xt+1,πt+1,πt,zt) 
  πt+1 = P(πt,zt). 
Let wt denote the vector [xt, zt, πt, Kt] so that the linearized system can be expressed as 
 Awt+1 = Bwt  
where A and B are 4x4 matrices with elements given by the derivatives of F, G, H and P.  
After inverting A, we are left with the matrix A
-1B which has four eigenvalues.  Since 
there is one state variable in this system (Kt), we need three explosive eigenvalues for 
determinacy.  Once again one is given by  






where ss denotes steady-state levels.  Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
determinacy is that two of the remaining three roots be outside the unit circle. Hence, 
there must be one real root within the unit circle.  The relevant cubic equation is given by 
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  22where   
  2 3 a J β =  
  2 1 2 ) 1 ( a a J β λ + − − =  
  1 2 1 a a J τ λ αλ + + =  
  τ λ α − = 0 J  
  ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 δ β α δ β − − = − − − = a and a . 
The above implies J(0) < 0 and  
  ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 α τ λ − − = a J . 
For determinacy we need exactly one real root in (0,1).  Hence, τ > 1 is necessary for 
determinacy.  The assumed condition in the proposition implies that J is concave at 1.  
Hence, the remaining two roots, either real or complex, must be outside the unit circle.  
QED 
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